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Abstract: Previous research suggests that audit quality may be influenced by various 
client characteristics. This dissertation examines whether changes in audit quality 
between different companies may be a reflection of audited companies’ own complexity. 
In this research, audit quality is proxied by ‘Absolute Discretionary Accruals’ and client 
complexity is proxied by ‘Sales to Industry’, the ‘Net Intangible Assets per Employee’, 
and a dummy variable for listed/unlisted companies (‘Listed Factor’). A series of 
regressions are run and aim to evaluate the relation between client complexity and audit 
quality and also to understand if that relations are similar between Big4 and NonBig4 
clients. Additionally, a survey with audit professionals and an interview with an audit 
manager are conducted in order to evaluate how field professionals perceive the relation 
between the two factors. The regression results generally suggest that client complexity 
does not influence audit quality. The interviewed manager also does not perceive that 
there is a relation between the two factors. On the other hand, the survey results suggest 
that most junior auditors believe that audit quality is improved by client complexity. 
Keywords: audit quality; client complexity; Big4 versus NonBig4 auditors; discretionary 
accruals; sales to industry; intangible assets per employee; listed versus private firms. 
Tittle: The Effect of Client Complexity on Audit Quality 
Author: Diogo Morais 
Resumo: Estudos anteriores sugerem que a qualidade da auditoria pode ser influenciada 
por várias características dos clientes. Esta dissertação explora a influência da 
complexidade das empresas na qualidade das auditorias que lhes são efetuadas. Neste 
estudo, é utilizado um proxy para a qualidade da auditoria – valor absoluto de provisões 
discricionárias – e três proxies para complexidade das empresas – vendas relativamente 
ao total da indústria, valor líquido de ativos intangíveis por funcionário e uma variável 
dummy relativa aos fatores cotada ou não cotada. São realizadas várias regressões que 
pretendem avaliar a relação entre a complexidade dos clientes e a qualidade da auditoria, 
e ainda perceber se essa relação é semelhante entre empresas auditadas por Big4 e por 
outras auditoras que não Big4. Adicionalmente, foi realizado um questionário junto de 
profissionais da área e uma entrevista com uma manager de auditora, com o objetivo de 
compreender o ponto de vista destes profissionais relativamente à relação entre os dois 
fatores. De forma geral, os resultados da regressão sugerem que a complexidade dos 
clientes não influencia a qualidade das auditorias. A manager entrevistada é também da 
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opinião de que não existe qualquer relação entre os dois fatores. Contrariamente, os 
resultados do questionário sugerem que a maioria dos auditores juniores acredita que 
quanto maior for a complexidade de um cliente, maior será a qualidade da auditoria. 
Palavras-chave: qualidade da auditoria; complexidade do cliente; Big4 versus NonBig4; 
provisões discricionárias; vendas face à indústria; ativos intangíveis por funcionário; 
empresas cotadas versus empresas privadas. 
Título: O Efeito da Complexidade dos Clientes na Qualidade das Auditorias 
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Financial statements should present fair information about a company’s financial 
position and performance. Stakeholders, including owners, investors, governmental 
institutions, creditors and even costumers, make decisions based on the information 
presented in financial statements (Kanapickienė and Grundienė, 2015). Investors depend 
on companies’ financial statements and economic data to better evaluate their investment 
decisions. Companies have incentives to falsify financial statements due to capital market 
pressure (Chen et al., 2019), reducing the purpose of fairness and integrity in which 
financial statements should be based on. For those reasons, falsified financial statements 
may result in enormous losses for both investors and creditors (Chen et al., 2019). 
According to the International Standards on Auditing (ISA), management is in a favorable 
position to manipulate accounting records by overriding controls (MOC – Management 
Override of Controls) and skewing records in the way that best suits the companies’ 
interests or even the management’s personal interests (Kanapickienė and Grundienė, 
2015). 
For those reasons, audit firms play an important role in the economy, assuring the 
quality, integrity, and transparency of financial statements. For audited companies 
(clients), audit is a valuable monitoring process to reduce agency costs with debt holders 
and stockholders (Becker et al., 1998). 
Prior literature studies the influence of different factors on Audit Quality (AQ), such 
as auditor size (DeAngelo, 1981; Lennox, 1999; Yuniarti, 2011), auditor mindset (Griffith 
et al., 2015), auditor report changes (Reid et al., 2019), amongst others. Lawrence et al. 
(2011) (hereafter LMZ), study the difference in audit-quality proxies between Big4 and 
NonBig 4 auditors. The study examines whether the differences in quality proxies could 
emerge as a reflection of clients’ characteristics. The results suggest that differences 
found in audit quality proxies between Big4 and NonBig 4 audits largely reflect clients’ 
characteristics, especially size. However, the authors highlight the fact that the study has 
not resolved the main underlying question and therefore encourage other researchers to 
explore alternative methodologies that separate client characteristics from audit quality 
effects. Eshleman and Guo (2014) follow the line of research proposed by Lawrence et 
al. (2011) and investigate the likelihood of accounting restatements issuance in 
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companies audited by Big4 and NonBig4, concluding that Big4 auditors do perform 
higher-quality audits. 
Following the suggestion of  Lawrence et al. (2011) and the lines of thought of  
Griffith et al. (2015) regarding complexity, this research aims to analyze how Audit 
Quality is influenced by Client Complexity (CC) and how the performance of similar 
sized audit companies varies according to client  complexity. To the best of my 
knowledge, no research has been developed to study this relationship. 
Using one audit quality proxy – ‘Absolute Discretionary Accruals – and three 
complexity proxies – ‘Sales to Industry’, ‘Net Intangible Assets per Employee’ and a 
dummy variable for listed/unlisted companies (‘Listed Factor’) – I find, through a set of 
regressions, that audit quality, in general, is not affected by client complexity. On the 
other hand, the results present statistical evidence that NonBig4 auditors perform worst 
in complex clients, when measuring complexity by the ‘Net Intangible Assets per 
Employee’. The survey and interview conducted reveal a difference of opinions between 
junior auditors and the interviewed manager, as the majority of junior auditors believe 
that client complexity increases audit quality and the manager’s perspective is that client 
complexity does not have an impact on audit quality. 
The results of this research are of interest to regulators, investors, creditors, audit 
committees, audit partners and managers, and even to other academics. More specifically, 
this study can be helpful to regulators as it helps them to better understand if audit firms 
are providing the same AQ across different types of firms. Investors and creditors might 
also find relevance in this research, as it can support them in assessing the credibility of 
a firm’s financial information, according to its characteristics. Managers and audit 
committees might find the analysis useful in the process of choosing an audit firm. This 
research could also provide important information to audit partners and managers as it 
may support them in managing teams’ efforts and mindsets according to the clients’ level 
of complexity. Lastly, the second part of the research, concerning the survey and the 
interview, may also provide relevant information to academics about their approach’s 
consistency with practitioners’/auditors’ views. 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1. Defining Audit Quality 
Audit firms play an important role in the economy, assuring the quality, integrity, and 
transparency of financial statements. They are the agents responsible for detecting and 
examining the fairness of a company’s financial statements (Yuniarti, 2011). 
The International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB)1 attributes great 
importance to achieving a common vision, among stakeholders, regarding the idea of AQ. 
According to IAASB (2011), AQ is, in its essence, a “complex and multi-faceted” 
concept. The perception of AQ may vary amongst stakeholders depending on their 
involvement in audits. IAASB suggests that, from an investor’s perspective, AQ may be 
perceived through the auditor’s report, the auditor’s reputation, or relevance/expectations 
of the audit. On the other hand, from the audit committee’s perspective, AQ may be 
perceived by the individual assessment of the auditor’s quality and its processes, 
alongside with the auditor’s communications and interactions. IAASB frames AQ in three 
different aspects: i) audit inputs, such as audit standards, auditor attributes (skill, 
experience, ethical values, and mindset) and audit processes (methodology and tools); ii) 
audit outputs (auditor’s report and communications); and iii) context factors (governance, 
laws, and regulations). 
Similarly, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (2015)2 (PCAOB) states 
that AQ can be viewed from three different perspectives: i) the auditor’s compliance to 
professional audit standards and the applicable law; ii) the auditor’s capability to meet 
the needs of public company’s investors and the marketplace, by performing independent, 
effective and reliable audits, led by skeptical professionals; iii) the timely and effective 
provision of information to audit committees and investors. 
Academics have also tried to define AQ. DeAngelo (1981) defines it as the market 
assessed probability that the auditor will both discover and report a breach in the client’s 
accounting system. Such probabilities are based on different characteristics of the audit 
firm. The first, discovering a breach, is dependent on the auditor’s technological and 
 
1 An independent standard-setting boarding, responsible for setting high-quality international standards 
for auditing. 
2 Nonprofit corporation established to oversee the audits of public companies in order to protect 
investors and public interest. 
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technical capabilities, while the second, reporting a breach (if found), depends on the 
auditor’s independence and integrity.  
The definition proposed by DeAngelo (1981) suggests a binary perspective over 
auditing processes. It emphasizes the simple detection and report of breaches, 
understating the importance of auditors in assuring that the clients’ financial statements 
genuinely reflect the firms’ underlying economics. DeFond and Zhang (2014) extend the 
previous definition by stating that AQ is a continuous construct that is not fully reflected 
in the auditors’ opinion/report. The authors defend that AQ refers to the quality of the 
auditors’ assurance/opinion and not to the opinion itself. They define AQ as the degree 
of “assurance that the financial statements faithfully reflect the firm’s underlying 
economics, conditioned on its financial reporting system and innate characteristics”.  
2.2. Measuring Audit Quality 
Given that the degree of assurance provided by auditors is unobservable, an audit’s 
quality strikes as a difficult feature to measure and for that reason audit researchers have 
been using a large set of proxies that rely on measurable inputs and outputs of the audit 
process (Robert Knechel et al., 2013). DeFond and Zhang (2014) summarized and 
reviewed a wide set of proxies used in the AQ literature. This section highlights some of 
those proxies as well as others found in the literature. 
Francis (2004) suggests that AQ can be measured by the rate of audit failure, which 
can be inferred by several sources such as auditor litigation and business failures, 
investigations by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and earnings 
restatements. Based on the same idea, research has used accounting restatements as a 
proxy for AQ. For example, Eshleman and Guo (2014) study differences between AQ in 
Big43 and NonBig4 auditors by proxying AQ as the ‘likelihood of a firm issuing an 
accounting restatement’. It is an output-based measure that allows to detect clear cases 
of poor AQ. However, it directly meets the definition provided by DeAngelo (1981), 
simply focusing on the auditor’s final report, which means it does not capture quality 
variations between companies that have not issued restatements. 
 
3 Big4 refers to the four largest audit and consulting companies in the world: Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu 
Limited; Ernst & Young Global Limited; KPMG; PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
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‘Absolute discretionary accruals’4 are also often used as a proxy for AQ (Becker et 
al., 1998; Lawrence et al., 2011; Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014). The rationale for using it 
is that higher-quality auditors will tolerate fewer earnings management from the client, 
therefore, companies with higher values of absolute discretionary accruals are associated 
with lower quality audits. This proxy allows to detect misstatements and to capture quality 
variation between firms. However,  it implies that all discretionary accruals are equally 
harmful to earnings quality (Eshleman and Guo, 2014).  
Based on the assumption that firms with more reliable financial reports have lower 
perceived risk, research has used the ‘cost-of-capital’ as a proxy for AQ (Mansi et al., 
2004; Pittman and Fortin, 2004). The underlying idea is that investors are willing to 
finance companies at a lower price if they perceive that their financial statements are more 
reliable. It is a perception-based proxy, easily obtainable for most companies and that 
accounts for subtle quality variations. However, it is a controversial measurement among 
researchers given that it is based on perception and not on direct measures. 
Lastly, Behn et al. (2008) find evidence that analysts of Big4 clients provide more 
accurate forecasts than analysts of NonBig4 clients. The reasoning for taking ‘analysts 
forecasts’ as an AQ proxy is that audit firms that perform higher-quality audits will 
increase the reliability of their clients’ financial reports and therefore analysts’ forecasts 
will tend to be more accurate for those firms. 
2.3. Determinants of Audit Quality 
Considering the previously reviewed proxies, frequently used to find or understand 
the determinants of AQ, this section describes some of the most relevant research papers 
on AQ. 
Prior research has identified several distinct factors that influence AQ. A well-known 
factor found in the literature is the effect of auditor size. DeAngelo (1981) argues that 
larger auditors, measured by the number of clients and consequently by the lower 
relevance of each client in the auditor’s portfolio, have stronger incentives to issue 
accurate reports since no single client is important to the audit firm. Therefore, large 
auditor firms have fewer incentives to behave opportunistically or to jeopardize their 
 
4 Discretionary accruals are non-mandatory expenses, recorded in a company’s accounting system, that 
are yet to be realized. Several studies show that managers may use discretionary accruals to “hide” 
information from investors (Bartov et al., 2010). 
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independence and integrity. The author also mentions that Big4 auditors perform better 
audits than other auditors because they have better training programs. Dye (1993) 
identifies the same relationship between auditor size and AQ by inferring that larger 
auditors, with more wealth at risk from litigation, have a bigger incentive to issue accurate 
reports. Early literature provides evidence consistent with DeAngelo's (1981) and Dye's 
(1993) theory. For example, Lennox (1999) studies the two effects described earlier and 
concludes that the threat of litigation stands out as the major driver to the superior 
accuracy of larger auditors. Research finds that Big4 auditors reveal a higher level of 
conservatism when issuing audit reports (Francis and Krishnan, 1999). Lennox and 
Pittman (2010) also show that the frequency of fraudulent financial reports is consistently 
lower for larger auditors. 
Nevertheless, there are also valid arguments defending that Big4 and NonBig4 firms 
could provide similar AQ. First, both Big4 and NonBig4 act according to the same 
regulations and professional standards, and for that reason, both firm types should provide 
an acceptable level of quality (LMZ). Second, NonBig4 have a closer relationship with 
their clients and a better knowledge of local markets (Louis, 2005). Third, NonBig4 firms 
cannot obtain the same level of assurance from insurance companies which could lead to 
an increase of the audit effort comparatively to Big4 (GAO, 2008 cited in LMZ). Fourth, 
personnel transfers as well as knowledge transfers between Big4 and NonBig4 may 
mitigate potential quality differences between auditors (LMZ).  
Despite the majority of studies supporting the relationship between auditor size and 
AQ, Reynolds and Francis (2001) find evidence indicating that differences in AQ may 
also reflect client characteristics, more specifically client size. The research results 
suggest that larger clients have smaller accruals and are more likely to receive “going 
concern” audit reports. This means that the importance of the threat of litigation and the 
risk of reputation damage, that audit firms face when they perform low quality audits, 
exceed the economic dependence on large clients that may encourage audit firms to 
compromise their independence and report favorable opinions in order to retain such 
clients. 
LMZ and Eshleman and Guo (2014) question the reliability of the above and other 
studies by identifying a potential endogeneity problem and by arguing that auditors will 
tend to prefer less risky clients the same way firms with better performance and higher 
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earnings will prefer Big4 auditors.5 Consequently, given that, for Big4 firms, clients have 
a smaller relevance in their portfolios than for NonBig4 firms, there will be a tendency 
for NonBig4 auditors to accept riskier clients. LMZ corrected for the endogenous choice 
of auditor by evaluating whether the Big4 effect6, identified by DeAngelo (1981), could 
emerge as a reflection of client characteristics. By using a propensity-score matching 
model7 to control for the differences in client characteristics between Big4 and NonBig4 
auditors, LMZ find evidence suggesting that the Big4 effect appears to be attributable to 
client characteristics. However, the authors highlight that the study has not resolved the 
main underlying question – “Can Big 4 versus Non-Big 4 Differences in Audit-Quality 
Proxies Be Attributed to Client Characteristics?” - and therefore encourage other 
researchers to explore alternative methodologies that separate client characteristics from 
AQ effects.  
Eshleman and Guo (2014) complemented and extended LMZ’s research by using a 
different AQ proxy – ‘likelihood of a firm issuing an accounting restatement’. By 
applying the same method as LMZ, the propensity-score matching model, Eshleman and 
Guo (2014) provide evidence that contradicts LMZ and suggest that Big4 firms provide 
higher AQ since their clients are significantly less likely to issue an accounting 
restatement. 
Another major topic discussed in the literature is the effect of audit firm rotation on 
AQ. There are two main views on this topic. The first, argues that longer audit tenures 
result in greater knowledge of the company’s business and therefore in higher AQ. The 
second, on the other hand, believes that longer tenures lead to closer relationships between 
audit staff members and client staff members which may compromise the audit 
independence. Van Johnson et al. (2002) show that short audit-firm tenures (two or three 
years), provide lower quality financial reports when compared to medium audit-firm 
tenures (four to eight years). Corbella et al. (2015), on the other hand, find that audit firm 
rotation improves AQ for NonBig4 clients, which may indicate a higher tendency for 
NonBig4 firms to let auditor-client relationships jeopardize AQ. 
 
5 Lawrence et al. (2011) and Eshleman and Guo (2014) were not the first authors to identify an 
endogenous choice of auditor. (Hogan, 1997), (Ireland and Lennox, 2002), and Lennox and Pittman (2010), 
all observe that the choice of auditor is endogenous. 
6 The assumption that Big 4 audit firms will provide higher quality audits. 
7 The propensity-score matching model is used to eliminate selection bias in observational studies by 
balancing covariates (the characteristics of participants) between treated and control groups. 
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Lastly, Griffith et al. (2015) claim that task complexity may have an influence on 
audit teams’ performance. Larger clients may be associated with more complex audits, 
which can lead to significant differences in AQ. On the other hand, if auditors are aware 
of that, they may even adopt a more critical mindset when auditing large firms. Griffith 
et al. (2015) point out the importance of mindsets in auditing procedures. The authors 
stress that auditors experience significant difficulty in auditing complex estimates and 
demonstrate that a deliberate mindset, defined as a mindset that leads to a careful and 
balanced analysis of the alternatives before taking action, improves auditor’s ability to 
identify unreasonable estimates and consequently, improves AQ. Griffith et al. (2015) 
explain that, on the other hand, an implemental mindset leads to a quick and decisive 
action without appropriate consideration. 




The purpose of this dissertation is to extend the research of LMZ, Eshleman and Guo 
(2014) and Griffith et al. (2015) on how AQ may be influenced by client characteristics. 
Most specifically, I will study the effect of client complexity on AQ. Instead of focusing 
on the endogenous choice of auditor to explain or disprove AQ differences between Big4 
and NonBig4 firms, this research aims to assess how audit teams engage and manage their 
efforts according to different types of CC, and to understand if audit firms of comparable 
size provide audits of equivalent quality across all of their client portfolio, independently 
of their complexity. Therefore, in this dissertation, the following hypotheses will be 
tested: 
H1: Client Complexity is not related to Audit Quality. 
H2: The effect of Client Complexity on Audit Quality is similar for Big4 and 
NonBig4 audits.  
Investigating these hypotheses will allow to conclude whether comparable audit firms 
are performing different quality audits according to CC or, in other words, if audit firms 
perform comparable audits in simple and complex clients. It may seem natural that 
complex companies will make it harder for auditors to perform as well as they would in 
simpler firms. However, if the auditor is already aware of a firm’s complexity, it may be 
encouraged to take measures regarding the amount of effort and resources that are 
allocated to such audit processes, as a way to compensate for the complexity of the tasks. 
If those measures are, on average, taken in a perfectly balanced manner, then, CC should 
not have an impact on AQ. However, if the auditor over or under compensates the amount 
of resources allocated to complex clients, in a way that it is reflected in differences in the 
audit’s quality, when compared with noncomplex clients, then we can say that CC has an 




To answer the proposed research questions, I perform two types of analysis. First, I 
collect secondary data, from established databases, and perform regression analyses to 
study the effect of complexity on AQ. The selected proxies and control variables are also 
used to compare the performance of similar-sized auditors on non-complex clients with 
their performance on complex clients. Similar auditors are defined in two groups: i) Big4 
auditors; ii) NonBig4 auditors. Second, surveys and interviews are conducted with 
auditors, to complement and provide possible justifications to the results of the 
regressions. 
3.1. Regression Analysis 
The following regression model is used across the different complexity proxies to test 
the relationship between client complexity and audit quality: 
 𝐴𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛼2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛼3𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛼4𝑅𝑂𝐴 +  𝜀 (1) 
 
3.1.1. Variable Selection – Audit Quality Proxy 
Taking into consideration the definitions of AQ and the proxies mentioned in the 
literature, this research resorts to the ‘absolute value of discretionary accruals’ 
(ADACC) to proxy for AQ, as it strikes as the proxy that better fits and captures the 
definition provided by DeFond and Zhang (2014). 
The estimation of discretionary accruals requires the computation of ‘total accruals’ 
(TACC). Following the early lines of research of Jones (1991), later used by several 
researchers (Dechow et al., 1995; Kothari et al., 2005; Bartov et al., 2010; LMZ), I use 
the balance sheet approach to compute TACC: 
 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡 =  ∆𝐶𝐴𝑡 −  ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡 −  ∆𝐶𝐿𝑡 +  ∆𝐷𝐶𝐿𝑡 − 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑡 (2) 
where: 
∆𝐶𝐴𝑡 = Current Assets in year t – Current Assets in year t-1 
∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡 = Cash and cash equivalents in year t – Cash and cash equivalents in year t-
1 
∆𝐶𝐿𝑡 = Current Liabilities in year t – Current Liabilities in year t-1 
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∆𝐷𝐶𝐿𝑡 = Debt included in Current Liabilities in year t – Debt included in Current 
Liabilities in year t-1 
𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑡 = Depreciation and amortization expense in year t 
There are several models for computing discretionary accruals. As proven by Dechow 
et al. (1995), the Modified Jones Model proves to be very efficient in detecting earnings 
management8. While the Jones Model is designed to control for the effects of changes in 
a firm’s economic circumstances, the Modified Jones Model also attempts to eliminate a 
potential error on the Jones Model, that arises when discretion is applied to revenue 
recognition (Bartov et al. 2010). The Modified Jones Model, estimated by year and 
















𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 is the total amount of assets at the end of year t-1 
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = Revenues in year t – Revenues in year t-1 
∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = Net Receivables in year t – Net Receivables in year t-1 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the amount of gross Property, Plant, and Equipment at the end of year t. 
𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the residual, which represents the firm-specific discretionary portion of accruals 
(DACC). 
3.1.2. Variables’ Selection – Complexity Proxies 
There are four main proxies for client complexity identified in the literature. One of 
them is the ‘conglomerate dummy’, which is equal to 1, in case the client firm is present 
in more than one industry, and equal to 0, in case the client firm has business divisions in 
a single industry (Markarian and Parbonetti, 2007). Another measure of complexity is the 
‘number of affiliates’, calculated by the number of affiliates owned, in more than 50%, 
by a parent organization (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2016). Complexity may also be 
measured by the amount of ‘R&D expenditures per employee’ (Markarian and 
 
8 The use of accounting techniques to adulterate financial statements in order to present a better view 
of a company’s financial position.  
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Parbonetti, 2007). The underlying idea behind this measure is that the higher the amount 
of intangible know-how within the firm, the higher its complexity. Finally, the percentage 
of the firm’s sales to the total industry sales is also another proxy for complexity – ‘Sales 
to Industry’ – the higher this measure is, the higher the customer base being captured by 
the firm, therefore requiring, on one side, a greater capability to deal with continuously 
changing needs and on the other, a greater capability to deal with larger competitive 
forces.  
The selection of some of these variables constrains the total amount of observations 
for the regressions since some of them are not as accessible as desired. For that reason, 
the ‘conglomerate’ and the ‘number of affiliates’ are not be employed as complexity 
proxies.  
Also, in alternative to ‘R&D expenditures per employee’, and based on the same 
underlying idea, I use the ‘Net Intangible Assets per Employee’ as a proxy for 
complexity since it allows for the collection of a larger amount of data and captures, in 
its essence, the same information. 
Finally, I study the effect of the ‘Listed Factor’ since listed companies may be 
subjected to more rigorous requirements from regulators which might increase the level 
of complexity of the audit process. I use a binary variable (dummy) to measure CC, in 
which listed companies will be defined as 1 and non-listed firms as 0. 
Summing up, the selected complexity proxies are ‘Sales to Industry’ (SalesToInd.), 
‘Net Intangible Assets per Employee’ (I.A./Emp.), and the ‘listed’ dummy variable 
(ListedFactor). 
3.1.3. Variables’ Selection – Control Variables 
Previous literature identifies several factors that influence discretionary accruals, for 
that reason, a group of control variables will be used. Following the lines of research of 
Corbella et al. (2015), I use: company size (‘SIZE’) measured by the natural log of sales 
- larger companies tend to have lower accruals; total leverage (‘LEV’), defined as long-
term debt plus current debt, scaled by total assets; return on assets (‘ROA’), defined by 
the income before extraordinary items, divided by total assets. 
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3.2. Survey and Interview 
A questionnaire is sent to approximately 60 audit analysts and senior audit analysts9 
of the Portuguese branch of a Big4 audit firm, with the objective of evaluating their 
perception of how CC influences AQ (see Exhibit 1). The questionnaire starts by asking 
auditors about their level of agreement with the complexity proxies used in this research 
and also with the definition of AQ provided by DeFond and Zhang (2014). Then, it 
focuses on each auditor’s personal experience regarding AQ, including several questions 
that relate factors believed to influence AQ, with different types of clients and moments 
of the audit process. Finally, the questionnaire includes a section that aims to understand 
how auditors perceive the influence of CC on AQ and what reasons may drive such 
influence.  
Additionally, an interview with an experienced auditor, with more than six years of 
experience (manager), is conducted (see Exhibit 2). The goal of this interview is to 
understand the point of view of knowledgeable professionals regarding AQ and CC, and 
how they believe these variables correlate. This interview is held after the regression and 
survey analysis, which allows for the discussion of the results with the qualified auditor. 
Inputs from an experienced professional add extreme value to this research. 
  
 
9Audit analysts and senior audit analyst have generally up to 6 years of audit experience. 
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4. Sample Selection 
For the regression analysis, I use firm-year data from a set of European companies, 
from 2010 to 2020. I restrict the analysis to this time period and geography because it 
provides a large amount of data, assuring a reliable analysis, and also because it better 
reflects the current audit conditions. Resorting to an older time period would influence 
the research with data from a time where audit knowledge and technology were not 
comparable with those we witness nowadays. 
To build the sample with the required variables that allow for the estimation of the 
discretionary accruals, I use data from Thomson Reuters Eikon (TRE). Two types of firms 
are selected. Firstly, I select all European listed companies, which amounts to 78,054 
firm-year observation. Secondly, in order to assure a higher probability of available data 
and a comparable size between private and public companies, I select large European 
private firms, which, according to the European Commission (2003) are the companies 
with more than 250 employees and with either an annual turnover greater than EUR 50 
million or a balance sheet total larger than EUR 43 million. It is assumed that listed 
companies and large private companies are audited. After applying the criteria for the 
selection of large companies, based on the latest annual report issued by each of them, I 
arrive at the total amount of 201,165 firm-year observations from large European private 
companies, leading to a total sample of 279,219 observations. After excluding all 
companies in the financial services industries (Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
Codes between 6000 and 6999) and after imposing all the necessary variables for the 
calculation of the discretionary accruals, I obtain a sample of 29,690 firm-year 
observations with data from 6,123 different companies. The main variable limiting the 
sample size due to its unavailability is ‘Property Plant and Equipment’. Table 1 
summarizes the sample selection process. Note that sample selection differs for each 





Table 1: Sample selection 
European Listed Firms 78,054 
Large European Private Companies 201,165 
Less: Financial Services Firms (SIC Codes 6000-6999) (63,380) 
Less: Missing data necessary to estimate discretionary accruals (186,149) 
Discretionary Accruals – Full Sample 29,690 
Less: Missing data necessary to calculate control variables (65) 
Regression using Proxies ‘Sales to Industry’ and ‘Listed Factor’ – Sample 29,625* 
Less: Missing ‘number of employees’ (8,131) 
Less: Missing ‘intangible assets’ (7,487) 
Regression using Proxy ‘Net Intangible Assets per Employee’ - Sample  14,007** 
  
* composed by 21,939 (74.06%) observations from currently listed companies and 7,686 (25.94%) from 
private companies. 





5. Results and Discussion 
In this chapter, I analyze the results of the model described in equation (1) when taking 
‘Sales to Industry’, ‘Net Intangible Assets per Employee’, and the ‘Listed Factor’ as a 
proxy for client complexity. I also analyze the survey results and the inputs provided by 
the interviewed manager. 
5.1. Regression Analysis 
5.1.1. Analysis I: Sales to Industry 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics regarding the sample used to study the 
influence of complexity on audit quality when taking ‘Sales to Industry’ as a proxy for 
complexity. This variable was calculated based on the three-digit North American 
Industry Classification System (NAICS) code of the entire initial sample, by dividing the 
total revenue of a firm, in a given year, by the sum of the revenue of the remaining 
companies in the same industry, in the same year. There are 29,625 firm-year 
observations, of which 5,961 (20.1%) reflect NonBig4 clients and 15,524 (52.4%) reflect 
Big4 clients. The remaining 8,140 (27.5%) firms did not have their auditor available on 
TRE. It is important to state that, among the firm-year observations with available 
information about the auditor, only 385 of them represent private firms, which means the 
test of Hypothesis II is limited since the analysis is essentially reflecting listed firms. This 
is a limitation that extends to the following sections. 
The descriptive statistics of this sample indicate that Big4 clients are significantly 
different from NonBig4 clients. NonBig4 clients present a mean value of absolute 
discretionary accruals higher than Big4 clients, as the results show a positive and 
significant difference in means between them (t=3.51; p-value<0.01), which implies that 
there is a tendency for Big4 auditors to perform better than NonBig4, meeting the ideas 
of DeAngelo (1981) and Dye (1993). Big4 clients are larger in size, more leveraged, and 
have approximately 5 times the return on assets of NonBig4 clients. Regarding the 
complexity proxy being analyzed, the results show that Big4 clients have a significantly 
higher percentage of their industry’s sales than NonBig4 clients, which means, they are 
significantly more complex (t=-12; p-value<0.01). The fact that Big4 clients are 
significantly larger (with a 99% confidence level) and have a higher percentage of their 
industry’s sales (with a 99% confidence level), confirms the ideas from LMZ and 
Eshleman and Guo (2014), about the endogenous choice of clients and auditors, by which 
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they state that Big4 auditors will tend to choose larger and often less risky clients, the 
same way larger companies will prefer larger audit firms. 
I start by measuring the effect of client complexity on AQ by taking ‘Sales to Industry’ 
as a proxy for complexity. The analysis shows that we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
(Table 3). In other words, we cannot affirm, by any standard degree of confidence, that 
client complexity has an influence on AQ when measuring these variables through ‘Sales 
to Industry’ and ‘Absolute Discretionary Accruals’, respectively. The estimated 
coefficient (α1) of 0.044 (Table 3), could mean that the higher the value of ‘Sales to 
Industry’, the higher the ‘Absolute Discretionary Accruals’, ceteris paribus, meaning 
smaller AQ. However, the estimation is not significant (p-value>0.05) and for that reason, 
we cannot infer a relationship between the two variables. Additionally, the goodness of 
fit of the model is low, with an R2 of 0.006, which means the model accounts for less than 
1% of the changes in absolute discretionary accruals. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 



























I.A./Emp. 190,690.3 132,253 199,298.2 -67,045.19*** 

































No. Obs. 29,625 5,961 15,524  
% of Total 100% 20.1% 53.4%  
     
*,**,*** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively, using a two-tailed t-test of 
differences in means. 





Table 3: Sales to Industry - Analysis 










































       
R2  0.006  0.017  0.002 
Adj. R2  0.006 
 
 0.016  0.002 
*,**,*** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively, using a two-tailed t-test of 
differences in means. 
Variables are as defined in section 3.1. 
Nevertheless, the regression results confirm that two of the selected control variables 
present significant estimated coefficients. On one hand, we can affirm, with a 99% degree 
of confidence, that size has a negative influence on the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals (-0.011;p-value<0.01), which means, larger firms have higher quality audits. On 
the other hand, higher leveraged clients have a larger value of absolute discretionary 
accruals (0.034; p-value<0.01), probably because, as previous researches concluded, 
leverage can be an incentive to use accruals to manage earnings, in order to avoid 
violating debt covenants (Jaggi and Lee, 2002). 
In order to test for Hypothesis II and evaluate if complexity has an influence on the 
AQ of similar-sized audit firms, I estimated the same variables, by regressing the model, 
in two separate samples. The first included only NonBig4 clients and the second only 
Big4 clients. The results of both analyses (Table 3) show that the proxy for complexity, 
‘Sales to Industry’, still has no significant influence on AQ, by any standard degree of 
confidence, as for NonBig4 clients we obtained a p-value of 0.764 and for Big4 clients, a 
p-value of 0.907. 
Size still maintains a significant negative coefficient (-0.013; p-value<0.01 and -
0.007; p-value<0.01), indicating that auditors perform better in larger firms. The 
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goodness of fit of each model is still low, though it fits the NonBig4 client sample much 
better than the Big4 client –  R2=0,017 and R2=0,002, respectively. 
5.1.2. Analysis II: Net Intangible Assets per Employee 
This analysis was based on a sample with 14,007 firm-year observations, of which 
3,197 (22.8%) reflect NonBig4 clients and 10,415 (74.4%) reflect Big4 clients. The 
remaining 395 (2,8%) companies did not have their auditor available on TRE. The amount 
of firm-year observations from companies with auditor information available is mainly 
reflecting listed firms (97,7%), which is an important limitation when testing for 
Hypothesis II. 
As presented in Table 2, the difference between the net value of intangible assets per 
employee of NonBig4 clients and of Big4 clients is also significant (-67,045; p-
value<0.01), as Big4 clients have a higher amount of intangible know-how within the 
firm and therefore they are more complex. 
Since the average value of ‘Net Intangible Assets per Employee’ of the sample is 
190,690 euros. For the regression of this model, that takes this value as a proxy for 
complexity, I divided each observation value by 10,000 to provide a more accessible 
interpretation of the results. This is represented in Table 4 by the variable ‘I.A./Emp.’. 
The results obtained through the regression of the model, presented in Table 4, 
indicate that we cannot, once again, reject the null hypothesis, that states the absence of 
an effect of complexity in AQ, by any standard level of confidence, given that, the 
estimated coefficient (α1) is approximately 0 and presents a p-value of 0.602. The 
goodness of fit of the model is even lower than the previous, R2=0.002. 
Nevertheless, the regression results confirm that two of the selected control variables 
present significant estimated coefficients. In this case, size and return on assets have a 
significant influence on absolute discretionary accruals. On one hand, larger clients are 
related to higher quality audits, as the estimated coefficient is significantly negative (-
0.013; p-value<0.01). On the contrary, the higher the return on assets, the worse the 






Table 4: Net Intangible Assets per Employee - Analysis 










































       
R2  0.002  0.034  0.001 
Adj. R2  0.002  0.033  0.001 
*.**.*** indicate significance at the 10. 5. and 1 percent levels. respectively. using a two-tailed t-test of 
differences in means. 
Variables are as defined in section 3.1. 
As done in section 5.1.1, Table 4 shows the results of the regression of equation (1), 
when taking the ‘Net Intangible Assets per Employee’ as a proxy for complexity and 
separating the sample in two different groups (NonBig4 and Big4 clients). The purpose 
is, once again, to study the impact of complexity on AQ, within a sample of similar-sized 
audit firms, to comprehend if there is a type of auditor more susceptible to complexity 
changes. The results show a positive and significant influence of intangible assets per 
employee on absolute discretionary accruals, for NonBig4 clients, as the estimated 
coefficient is 0.0001 and the p-value is 0.012. Therefore, we can reject the null hypothesis 
and affirm, with a 98.8% level of confidence, that complexity, when measured by the net 
value of intangible assets per employee, has a negative influence on audit quality, for 
NonBig4 clients. The impact is small since an increase of 10,000 euros in this proxy, is 
only expected to lead to an increase of 0.0001 on the absolute discretionary accruals, 
ceteris paribus, and the average value of absolute discretionary accruals of the sample is 
0.0884. The NonBig4 model presents the highest fitness so far, with an R2 of 0.034, 




Concerning Big4 clients, no relationship between complexity and AQ can be inferred, 
as the p-value of the estimated coefficient is not significant by any standard level of 
confidence. The degree of fitness of the model is low (R2=0.001). 
Size, however, has a negative and significant estimated coefficient for both samples, 
indicating, once again, that auditors tend to perform better in larger firms. 
5.1.3. Analysis III: Listed Factor 
This sample is composed of 29,625 firm-year observations, of which 21,939 (74.1%) 
of them correspond to currently listed firms and 7,686 (25.9%) are private.  
Table 5 summarizes the outputs that resulted from the regression of equation (1) when 
taking the listed dummy variable as a proxy for CC. The analyzed sample is the same as 
the one used in Section 5.1.1, and the estimated coefficients of the control variables as 
well as their p-values are very similar. The R2 and the Adjusted R2 values are also 
identical. The estimated coefficient for ‘SIZE’ shows that auditors tend to perform better 
in larger clients (-0.011, p-value<0.01) and in less leveraged companies (0.034; p-
value<0.01). Regarding the complexity proxy analyzed – ‘Listed Factor’ – we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis, which means that we cannot affirm, by any standard level of 
confidence, that a company being listed or private has an influence on AQ (0.000; p-
value>0.05). 
When excluding companies that do not have available information about their auditor, 
in order to test for Hypothesis II and separate the sample in NonBig4 and Big4 clients, I 
obtain a sample of 21,485 firm-year observations, of which 21,100 (98.2%) are currently 
listed companies. The amount of dropped firm-year observations due to lack of auditor 
information amounts to 8.140, of which 7.301 (89.7%) are non-currently listed 
companies. I conclude that private companies are barely represented in this analysis since 
the majority of them do not have auditor information available on TRE, and for that 




Table 5: Listed Factor - Analysis 
 
Variable 
 Estimated Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Intercept  0.295*** 
(0.000) 
ListedFactor  0.000 
(0.93) 
SIZE  -0.011*** 
(0.000) 
LEV  0.034*** 
(0.000) 
ROA  0.000 
(0.323) 
   
R2  0.006 
Adj. R2  0.006 
 
*.**.*** indicate significance at the 10. 5. and 1 percent levels. 
respectively. using a two-tailed t-test of differences in means. 
Variables are as defined in section 3.1. 
 
5.2. Survey and Interview 
In this section, I present and discuss the results of the survey, as well as relate them 
with the main ideas and opinions provided by the audit manager during the interview. 
The questionnaire is divided into five parts. The first part (Q1 and Q2) aims to assess 
the perception of auditors about how the proxies identified in section 3.1.2 increase CC, 
on a scale from 1 (Definitely Not) to 5 (Definitely Yes). It also includes an open-ended 
question about other possible factors that may influence CC. The second part (Q3 and 
Q4) includes a question about the level of agreement with the definition provided by 
DeFond and Zhang (2014), on a scale from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree), 
and also an open-ended question about possible comments on such definition. The third 
part (Q5 to Q12) includes eight questions about AQ, in which auditors are asked to relate 
different factors believed to improve AQ, with different types of clients and moments of 
the audit process – on a scale from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree). The 
fourth, and probably most important part (Q13 to Q15), includes a direct question 
regarding the influence of CC on AQ and a different question (conditioned on the answer 
given before) regarding the reasons that might explain such influence. Finally, the 
questionnaire includes two optional demographic questions (Q16 and Q17), one for 
gender and the other for years of experience in the audit field. 
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Before moving to the discussion of the survey, it is important to restate that it was 
conducted only with auditors whose current/former position in the audit firm is/was below 
Manager, which generally means that auditors have up to six years of experience. On the 
other hand, the interview was held with an experienced audit manager, responsible for 
the oversight of several audit teams in different client firms and with more than six years 
of experience. 
The survey gathers answers from a total of 42 audit professionals. The results show a 
balanced gender distribution, with 21 (50%) female answers and 20 (48%) male answers. 
As gender was an optional question, one (2%) of the respondents did not answer.  
The average experience of respondents is 2.63 years, with a maximum of 6 years and 
a minimum of approximately 10 months. This was also an optional question and six (14%) 
respondents did not answer. The distribution regarding the years of experience shows that 
it is a low experienced sample, revealing a mode of 2 years. 
The first question of the survey asks respondents about their agreement regarding the 
influence of the proxies mentioned in section 3.1.2 on CC (on a scale from 1 to 5). The 
answers reveal that, on average, auditors agree that the five proxies increase CC (Table 
6). The number of subsidiary firms and the fact that a company has businesses in several 
industries strike as the most determinant factors that increase CC, according to 
respondents. The first has a mean level of agreement of 4.60 and the second of 4.40. 93% 
of respondents indicate a positive relationship between the number of subsidiary firms 
and CC, and 95% agree that clients that work in more than one industry are also more 
complex. On average, auditors also believe that listed clients are more complex (X̅ = 
4.29), as well as clients with high market share (X̅=3.98) and high R&D expenditures 
(X̅=3.76). This reveals that the proxies used for CC (‘Sale to Industry’, ‘I.A./Emp.’ and 
‘ListedFactor’) reflect what auditors perceive as factors that make clients more complex. 
However, the two most relevant factors for auditors were not used as proxies due to the 
unavailability of information on the established database used (TRE), although they were 
mentioned and described in section 3.1.2 (‘number of affiliates’ and ‘conglomerate 
dummy’). When asked about other factors that might influence CC, auditors state that a 
client’s history of past problematic issues with regulators, dysfunctional working systems, 
and lack of opening and professionalism from the client’s employees, are also drivers for 
CC. The interviewed manager agrees that the five determinants may influence CC and 
adds that the political and economic context and complex shareholder structures may also 
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increase a client’s complexity. Moreover, the manager states that the relationship between 
auditor and client may impose difficulties in the audit process, as the majority of clients 
do not see auditors as someone that may add value to the firm, but as someone that will 
make the job harder, increase the amount of work as well as constantly ask for additional 
information and requests that take time from client employees to respond.  Additionally, 
the manager adds that “a robust Internal Control System (ICS) is essential to achieve a 
higher quality audit making the job easier and less complex”. 
Regarding the AQ definition proposed by DeFond and Zhang (2014), stating that AQ 
is a continuous construct defined by the “degree of assurance that the financial statements 
faithfully reflect the firm’s underlying economics”, the majority of auditors (93%) show 
some level of agreement (at least 5 on a scale from 1 to 7) and only one (2%) of the 
respondents show some level of disagreement (3 on the same scale) proving that this 
definition was a good starting point to support the choice of the AQ proxy. The remaining 
5% did neither agree nor disagree. Other important issues raised by the auditors regard 
the quality of the given recommendations and the quality of the working papers that 
sustain the auditors’ opinion, as these factors also define the quality of an audit procedure 
and do not seem to be included in DeFond and Zhang's (2014) definition. Interestingly, 
in the interview, and before being presented with the definition, the manager defines AQ 
as the degree of confidence that most of the financial information is accurate, visibly 
converging to the idea of DeFond and Zhang's (2014). The manager also highlights the 
importance of the quality of working papers, as they should allow for an easy revision by 
managers, partners, and by the Engagement Quality Control Review (EQCR).  
Table 6: Survey Results – Summary of Answers to Question 1 
 
 Does this factor increase Client 
Complexity? 
  Mean  Agree (%)* 
Client firm has business divisions in 
several industries 
 
4.4  95,24% 
Client firm has high market share  3.98  71.43% 
Client firm has R&D expenditures  3.76  65.85% 
Client firm has several subsidiary 
firms 
 
4.6  92.86% 
Client is listed  4.29  78.57% 
     
* percentage of responses that present a minimum level of agreement, meaning at least 4 on a scale 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). 
25 
 
The survey results reveal that, from the auditors’ perspective, high audit teams’ 
experience, high likelihood of external revision, and high CC increase AQ, with X̅=4.74, 
X̅=4.48, and X̅=3.83, respectively, on a scale from 1 to 5. On average, auditors believe 
that high audit firm rotation and a high number of working hours have a smaller influence 
on AQ, X̅=3.07 and X̅=3.00, respectively. 
Auditors consider (on a scale from 1 to 5) that AQ should be higher in the six different 
situations they were asked about (Q6) (Table 7). Question 7 aims to understand how well 
auditors believe they are performing in those situations. As can be seen in Table 7, there 
are four situations in which, on average, auditors believe AQ should be higher than the 
one they are actually performing, since the mean difference between Q6 and Q7 is 
positive: during the first year of the audit tenure (X̅=2.92) with a difference of  0.75; last 
year of the audit tenure (X̅=3.91) and a difference of 0.16; when auditing a renowned firm 
(X̅=3.66) with a difference of 0.27; and when the client is considered complex (X̅=3.77) 
with a difference of 0.35. When auditing a listed firm (X̅=4.30), the mean difference is 
nearly 0, which means auditors believe they are performing as well as they think they 
should. The only situation in which auditors’ opinion is that they are performing an audit 
of higher quality than they should is when the work is likely to be reviewed since the 
mean is higher in Q7 (X̅=4.6) than in Q6 (X̅=4.26) and the difference is -0.34. After 
testing for the significance of the mean difference, I find that during the first year of the 
audit tenure and when clients are complex, auditors significantly believe to be 
underperforming, with a degree of confidence of 95% and 90%, respectively. Both 
situations lead to task complexity and difficulty. The first, due to the fact that all tasks are 
being performed for the first time for that client, and audit teams are still in a learning 
process regarding the client’s business. The second because of the client’s characteristics 
or the client’s business itself. Auditors seem to assume the importance of providing a 
high-quality audit for such clients, but at the same time admit that those are situations in 
which they generally cannot meet their own expectations. I also find that the mean 
difference for works that are likely to be externally reviewed is significant, except for this 
time, auditors believe to be overperforming. This is one situation in which auditors are 
pressured to perform a better job and may even be concerned that an error will be detected 
during the external revision process, those are possible reasons that may lead to a better 




Table 7: Survey Results – Summary of Answers to Question 6 and 7 
 
 Q6. When should 
AQ be higher? 
 Q7. When do you feel 



































































76.19  3.77  64.10  
0.35* 
(-1.7854) 
           
*.**.*** indicate significance at the 10. 5. and 1 percent levels. respectively. using a two-tailed t-test of 
differences in means. 
**** percentage of responses that present a minimum level of agreement, meaning at least 4 on a scale 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). 
The results from the third part of the survey (Table 8) reveal how different situations 
of the audit work are associated with a demand for higher AQ, by relating them with 
factors believed to increase AQ. During the first year of the audit firm’s tenure, auditors 
feel workloads are higher (X̅=4.58), they have more skeptical mindsets (X̅=4.24), the 
quality of supervision from managers and partners is superior (X̅=4.08), teams are larger 
(X̅=4.00) and there is a high pressure from managers and partners (X̅=3.95). This 
happens, most likely, because first-year audits tend to be more complicated than the 
following ones. Auditors need to understand the company’s business, its structure, and 
its systems for the first time, which might be why they tend to have a more skeptical 
mindset. As years go by, audit procedures tend to be more standardized for each company, 
therefore auditors’ workload may be reduced, managers and partners will tend to trust the 
work more easily, and workloads, as well as teams’ size, may be reduced. The last year 
of the audit tenure is also associated with a high demand for AQ, as all the previous factors 
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present means above 3, except for teams’ size (X̅=2.61), possibly for the reasons 
mentioned before -  auditors have a better knowledge about the client and can perform 
the work more easily and so fewer team members are required. However, all of the factors 
show a lower mean than the responses related with the first year of the audit tenure, as 
expected – higher workload (X̅=3.74), higher quality of supervision (X̅=3.85), more 
skeptical mindsets (X̅=3.24) - except for the higher pressure from managers and partners 
(X̅=4.00). 
When auditing a renowned firm, auditors seem to feel a high demand for AQ. Because 
these types of clients are better known and are more subjected to media exposure, it 
possibly leads to higher pressure from managers (X̅=4.25) and higher workloads 
(X̅=4.00). The quality of supervision also tends to be high (X̅=3.91), according to 
respondents, while there seems to be a difference in opinions regarding larger teams’ size 
(X̅=3.29) and more skeptical mindsets (X̅=3.49), as the means are closer to 3 (neither 
agree nor disagree) and only 47.37% and 51.35% of the respondents show some level of 
agreement (at least 4 on a scale from 1 to 5), respectively. Respondents perceive the audit 
process of listed firms similarly to renowned firms, regarding the demand for AQ. In this 
case, all the factors described show a higher mean than in the case of renowned firms, 
possibly because most listed firms share the same media exposure but also get more 
attention from regulators. Teams’ size (X̅=3.87) and skeptical mindsets (X̅=4.03) are also 
the factors with the lowest means and lower level of agreement – 71.79% and 68.42%, 
respectively – while a higher pressure from managers and partners is strongly felt by 
respondents (X̅=4.55) with almost 95% showing some level of agreement. Auditors also 
feel that workloads and the quality of supervision are higher when auditing listed firms – 
X̅=4.29 and X̅=4.28, respectively. The most extreme situation identified is when the work 
is likely to be reviewed. This situation presents the highest mean on all factors except for 
teams’ size (X̅=3.88), which according to auditors, are only larger during the first year of 
the audit tenure (X̅=4.00). “Work is likely to be reviewed”, is the situation, amongst the 
six described in Table 8, when auditors feel the highest pressure from managers and 
partners (X̅=4.83), when workloads are perceived as higher (X̅=4.71), when the quality 
of supervision from managers and partners is higher (X̅=4.83) and also when auditors feel 
they have a more skeptical mindset (X̅=4.47). This situation appears to be a huge driver 
for AQ, according to respondents. When asked about this, the manager disagrees that a 
higher likelihood of external revision would lead to a higher level of confidence in the 
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financial statements’ accuracy. According to the manager, “auditors tend to be more 
thorough and exhaustive in documenting and supporting the audit procedures, but it does 
not impact the degree of assurance that the financial statements truly reflect the firms’ 
underlying economics”. If we take into consideration both the manager’s and the 
respondents’ opinions, that mention reporting/documenting quality as a component of 
AQ, we can affirm that, from their perspective, the likelihood of external revision is a 
driver for higher AQ. Finally, CC is also perceived as a driver for higher AQ demand. 
Respondents feel higher pressure from managers and partners (X̅=4.13), higher 
workloads (X̅=4.20), a higher quality of supervision from managers and partners 
(X̅=3.85), they believe teams tend be larger (X̅=3.68) and also believe they have a more 
skeptical mindset (X̅=3.85). 
In the next part of the survey, auditors are directly asked about their perspective on 
how CC influences AQ. Interestingly, answers are quite dispersed as 24% believe CC 
decreases AQ, 69% believe it increases AQ and only 7% believe that there is no relation 
between these two variables. Those who believe that CC decreases AQ, present as major 
reasons the lack of help and support from Managers and Partners in complex clients, the 
unappropriated teams’ size and workload, and also the fact that staff should be more 
experienced in those clients. On the other hand, those who believe CC increases AQ, 
indicate as the main reasons the fact that staff is more experienced and also have a more 
skeptical mindset in such clients, as well as the fact that Managers/Partners are more 
demanding and perform better quality revisions. Nevertheless, three (7%) respondents 
believe that CC does not have an influence on AQ, which meets the main results found 
in the regression of the models described in sections 5.1.1, 5.1.2 and 5.1.3. When asked 
about how CC influences AQ, the interviewed manager disagrees with the majority of 
respondents by stating that CC does not influence AQ as nowadays “methodologies are 
more and more tailored and adapted to each client’s characteristics, assuring a 
standardization of audit quality”. The manager also states that audit works involve several 
layers of revision and for that reason, gaps in quality are more likely to be detected. The 
manager affirmed that when clients are considered complex, audit teams bring together 
specialists from different areas to assure a better understanding of the company, which 





Table 8: Survey – Summary of Answers from Question 8 to 12 
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3.95  72.97  4.58  91.64  4.08  75.00  4.00  69.24  4.24  78.38 
During the last 









4.25  86.11  4.00  75.67  3.91  71.43  3.29  47.37  3.49  51.35 
When auditing 
a listed firm 
 
4.55  94.74  4.29  84.21  4.28  83.33  3.87  71.79  4.03  68.42 
When the work 




4.83  97.57  4.71  97.56  4.83  97.50  3.88  66.66  4.47  85.00 
When the client 




4.13  77.5  4.20  80.48  3.85  69.23  3.68  56.09  3.85  72.5 
                     




In this dissertation, I examined whether client complexity causes differences in the 
quality of audits. By using three different methodologies (regression analysis, survey, and 
interview), I aimed to understand the relation between client complexity and audit quality, 
and also whether this relation is similar for Big4 and NonBig4 auditors. 
By using three different complexity proxies (‘Sales to Industry’, ‘Net Intangible 
Assets per Employee’, and ‘Listed Factor’) and by taking ‘Absolute Discretionary 
Accruals’ as a proxy for audit quality, the results of the regression analysis suggest that 
there is no statistical evidence that client complexity influences audit quality. One 
interpretation of this is that audit teams are aware of clients’ complexity and are able to 
properly manage efforts, mitigating the eventual difficulties that may arise when auditing 
this type of client. When evaluating differences between Big4 and NonBig4, the 
regression shows that, for NonBig4 clients, higher client complexity, when measured by 
the ‘Net Intangible Assets per Employee’, leads to higher discretionary accruals, meaning 
lower AQ, however the economic magnitude is very low. The survey results suggest that 
the majority of auditors believe that client complexity improves audit quality and consider 
that the main driver for a high-quality audit is the likelihood of external revision. The 
interviewed manager, however, does not believe in any relation between client 
complexity and audit quality as audit firms have resources to mitigate task complexity, 
making the audit quality similar between all client portfolio. Regarding the likelihood of 
external revision, the manager believes it only leads to a clearer and more extensive 
documentation of the audit work, and not to a higher degree of assurance that the financial 
statements truly reflect the companies’ underlying economics. 
The findings in this dissertation are subject to a few limitations. First, the regression 
inferences are dependent on an audit quality proxy that may measure it with error, by 
implying that all ‘discretionary accruals’ are harmful to earnings quality (Eshleman and 
Guo, 2014). According to the survey respondents’ comments on Question 4, there are 
several different aspects that define the quality of an audit work and that are not being 
captured by the selected proxy. Second, although the complexity proxies that were used 
are consistent with the respondents’ opinions, they are not the ones that better reflect 
client complexity. Those proxies were not used due to lack of available information on 
the database used (TRE). Third, it is not assured that all relevant control variables are 
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included. Fourth, and probably the main limitation of this research, is related to a 
significant loss of observations due to lack of data. Moreover, the majority of companies, 
for which there is auditor information available, are listed companies, which may 
introduce some biases in the results (when testing for Hypothesis II), in the sense that 
those results might not be extended to private firms. That is also the reason why 
Hypothesis II was not tested for the third complexity proxy (‘Listed Factor’). 
The research model used could be extended by using different proxies, either for 
complexity or audit quality. The results of the regressions also leave space for further 
investigation, whether by extending the sample size, in a way that more private companies 
are included, or even by evaluating the effect of client complexity in different regions of 
the world. Since the results only concern European firms, different conclusions could 
arise if the study was conducted in the United States of America, for example. I leave 
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Exhibit 1 – Survey 
This survey is being conducted as part of a Dissertation Research at Católica Lisbon 
- School of Business and Economics: "The Influence of Client Complexity on Audit 
Quality". The survey is directed to current and former audit analysts. It aims to understand 
what is the auditors' perception of Audit Quality and Client Complexity, as well as to 
comprehend how Audit Quality is influenced by Client Complexity from the auditors' 
point of view. Your answers will be very important to complement the research.  
The survey is completely anonymous and will take approximately 5 minutes. If you 
have any questions, please contact: 152416024@alunos.lisboa.ucp.pt 
Thank you for your time! 
Q1: Based on your experience, do the following factors contribute to the increase of 
Client Complexity? 
 

































o  o  o  o  o  o  
Client is 
listed o  o  o  o  o  o  
36 
 
Q3: Academics often define Audit Quality as a continuous construct defined by the 
auditors' degree of assurance that the financial statements faithfully reflect the firm’s 
underlying economics, conditioned on its financial reporting system and innate 
characteristics.  
To what extent do you agree with this definition? 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree 
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree 
o Agree 
o Strongly agree 
Q4: Based on your experience, would you like to add any comments about your definition 
of Audit Quality? (Optional) 















Hours  o  o  o  o  o  o  
High Audit 




o  o  o  o  o  o  
High Client 





o  o  o  o  o  o  
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Q10: Based on your experience, when do you feel the quality of supervision from 















































































































































































Q13: Based on your experience, how do you think Client Complexity influences Audit 
Quality? 
o Client Complexity decreases Audit Quality 
o Client Complexity does not influence Audit Quality 
o Client Complexity improves Audit Quality 
If Q13: Based on your experience, how do you think Client Complexity influences Audit Quality? 
= Client Complexity improves Audit Quality 
Q14: Why does Client Complexity improve Audit Quality? 
▢ Teams' size is more appropriate in complex clients  
▢ Staff is more experienced in complex clients  
▢ Managers and Partners are more demanding in complex clients   
▢ Managers and Partners are more helpful in complex clients  
▢ Revision is of higher quality in complex clients  
▢ There is a more skeptical mindset in complex clients   
▢ Workload is more appropriate in complex clients   
▢ Others ________________________________________________ 
If Q13: Based on your experience, how do you think Client Complexity influences Audit Quality? 
= Client Complexity decreases Audit Quality 
Q15: Why does Client Complexity decrease Audit Quality? 
▢ Teams' size is not appropriate in complex clients  
▢ Staff should be more experienced in complex clients  
▢ Managers and Partners should be more demanding in complex clients  
▢ Managers and Partners should be more helpful in complex clients  





▢ Mindsets should be more skeptical in complex clients  
▢ Workload is not appropriate in complex clients  
▢ Others ________________________________________________ 
Q16: For how many years do you work in the audit field? (Optional) 
Q17: Gender (Optional) 
o Male 
o Female 
Exhibit 2 – Manager interview script 
1. DeFond and Zhang (2014) claim that audit quality is a continuous construct that 
is not fully reflected in the auditors’ opinion/report. They define audit quality as 
the degree of “assurance that the financial statements faithfully reflect the firm’s 
underlying economics, conditioned on its financial reporting system and innate 
characteristics”. To what extent do you agree with the definition provided by 
DeFond and Zhang (2014). 
2. How would you define audit quality? 
3. Could you please comment the results obtained in the survey, regarding audit 
quality? 
4. In your perspective, what is client complexity? What makes a client complex? 
5. Could you please comment the results obtained in the survey, regarding client 
complexity? 
6. To what extent do you think the proxies found in the literature are able to reflect 
client complexity? 
7. Do you think client complexity influences audit quality? How? Why? 
8. Could you please comment the regression results?  
9. Finally, could you please comment the fact that the likelihood that the work is 
externally reviewed is a huge driver to superior audit quality, according to 
respondents? 
